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The Future of NLRB Doctrine on
Captive Audience Speeches†
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
“The Board is . . . entitled to suspicion when faced with an employer’s benevolence
as its workers’ champion . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “Act”),2 as interpreted by the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) over the last
sixty years, employers have been permitted to give captive audience speeches at
work to employees contemplating unionization.3 Employees must attend such
meetings, may not be able to question the employer representative, and may not
have the union come to the workplace to present opposing views. 4 Not surprisingly,
these speeches are one of the most effective anti-union weapons that employers
currently have in their arsenal.5

† Copyright © 2012 Paul M. Secunda.
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and the Indiana Maurer law faculty for inviting me
to participate in this Symposium on Labor and Employment Law Under the Obama
Administration: A Time for Hope and Change? I am indebted to Michael Duff, John
Higgins, Jeff Hirsch, Joe Slater, and Andrew Strom for their insightful and helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article. I dedicate this article to my law students, who have been a
constant source of enjoyment, inspiration, and pride over the years.
1. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
4. See NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 8, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974); Litton
Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968); Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 811–12,
815 (1967).
5. Although there is an older study by William Dickens suggesting that captive
audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union certification
elections, William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification
Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 574–75 (1983)
(concluding that employers’ written communications, captive audience speeches, threats, and
actions taken against union supporters all have statistically significant effects on voting in
union certification elections), perhaps even more illuminating are recent statistics
establishing the percentage of employers who use such tactics and how often they use them,
KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 73 (2000), http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/reports/3/ (report indicating that 92% of 400 employers engaged in captive
audience meetings during union organizational campaigns and that employees were subject,
on average, to eleven captive audience meetings during such campaigns). See also William
B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of LaborManagement Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461,
484 (2007) (citing San Diego Gas & Elec., 325 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1146–47 (1998)) (“[T]he
captive audience technique, in which employees are called together on company time and
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In previous articles, I have alternatively argued that states should be able to
legislate against such captive audience meetings free from NLRA preemption; 6 that
such employer meetings amount to coercive conduct against employees in
derogation of their section 7 right to organize; 7 and that in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court campaign finance decision in Citizens United v. FEC,8 employers
will likely expand the use of captive audience speeches from the union campaign
context into the political campaign context, and thus, federal legislation is required
to prevent this from happening. 9 These prior articles sought to establish the danger
to employee-workplace rights caused by permitting unfettered, employer captive
audience meetings at the workplace. In response to these concerns, I have set
forward different approaches that the federal government, states, courts, and the
NLRB could take to eliminate or minimize the impact that this type of employer
conduct has on employee rights.
This contribution to the Symposium, Labor and Employment Law Under the
Obama Administration: A Time for Hope and Change?, focuses on perhaps a more
pragmatic issue: the likely future of Board doctrine in the area of employer captive
audience speeches. Not only does this not involve the more difficult questions
concerning NLRA preemption when states seek to legislate in this area, but it also
does not discuss whether Supreme Court decisions in the election law area have
made the workplace riper for employers to give labor, political, and/or religious
captive audience speeches and the consequent need for protective federal
legislation in this context.
This Article seeks to answer a series of narrower, and yet more practical
questions, now that the Board has both a quorum and a Democratic majority. 10 The

company property, has proved to be an extremely devastating technique in organizational
campaigns. It is so devastating a technique that when the Board instituted postal ballots in
limited circumstances in the 1990s, emphatic dissents were registered by the Board’s
Republican members on the ground that balloting over an extended period of time, which
would allow the employees to get their ballots at their home addresses, would deprive the
employer of an a opportunity to use anti-union speech.”).
6. See Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
209 (2008). I have also advocated for the validity of the Oregon anti-captive audience
meeting law in Associated Oregon Industries v. Avakian, No. CV 09-1494-MO, 2010 WL
1838661 (D. Or. May 6, 2010). See Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 09-CV-1494-MO, 2010 WL
1838661 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2009). The case was eventually dismissed in favor of defendants
on non-substantive standing grounds. See Associated Or. Indus., 2010 WL 1838661, at *5.
7. See Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”: Employer
Captive Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FLA. INT’L. U.L. REV. 385 (2011).
8. 130 S. Ct. 876, 885 (2010) (holding “that the Government may not suppress political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,” and that “[n]o sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”).
9. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings
in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2010).
10. The Board operated for twenty-seven months with a two-member Board and decided
over 500 cases. Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Case Production in FY 2010: Rising Numbers
in an Eventful Year 1 (Oct. 7, 2010), http://nlrb.gov/news-media/news-releases/archivenews. The U.S. Supreme Court in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644–
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first question in this series of inquiries must be: what is the likelihood that the
Board will hear a case concerning captive audience speech in the near future?
Second, if the Board reviews such a case, what are the chances that a Board
majority will limit the rights of employers to engage in captive audience speeches?
Third, and perhaps most interesting and difficult to predict: if the Board overturns,
to some extent, current doctrine concerning this type of employer activity, what
will be the reasoning that the Board utilizes to reach its conclusion?
On the first question, it is difficult to speculate when, or if, a captive audience
case will make its way to the Board for decision, although there do appear to be at
least a few case presenting captive audience issues currently pending NLRB
review.11 Uncertainty also arises in this area because of the way in which Board
procedures work12 and because it is unclear how long the Board will remain with a
Democratic Board majority.13 Of course, chances for review also depend on
whether the Board will again become incapacitated through not having the required
three-person quorum,14 and how long President Obama remains in office. 15
45 (2010), invalidated those decisions based on the Board not having at least a three-member
quorum of its normal five-member complement. As of October 2011, the Board has three
members including two Democratic members (Chairman Pearce and Member Becker) and
one Republican member (Member Hayes). See The Board: The Members of the National
Labor Relations Board, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board.
11. See Newburg Eggs, Nos. 3-CA-27834 & 3-RC-11918, at 11–12, 14 (A.L.J. Div.
Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/search/advanced/all/%28case%3A03-CA-027834%29
(finding violations occurring during captive audience meetings and setting aside election); 2
Sisters Food Grp., Inc., No. 21 CA 38915, at 18–19 (NLRB, June 10, 2010),
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-038915. The union in 2 Sisters Food Group, Inc., actually
asked the Board to completely outlaw captive audience meetings. No. 21 CA 38915 at 18
(“[T]he Board should use this opportunity to prohibit captive audience meetings by the
employer during the critical period.”).
12. Only the NLRB General Counsel can issue a complaint upon a formal charge that
the employer or union engaged in an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006). Of the
24,720 unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges filed in 2005, only 38.5% were found to have
merit and resulted in the General Counsel issuing a complaint. Charges and Complaints,
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/chartsdata/chargeComp#chart1tag. In FY 2010, the Board
issued 315 decisions in contested cases. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 10. Moreover,
it is even more difficult to have an election objection reviewed by the Board given the
deferential review standards in this context. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (1965) (outlining the
limited basis for Board review of Regional Director's decisions in the representation case
context).
13. Board members are either appointed for five-year terms, or the president appoints
them through the recess appointment process. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). At the end of their
appointment period, their Board service ends, or they are appointed for an additional term.
See id. Members serve staggered five-year terms; a different majority may be appointed
within three years of the appointment of a new president. Id. More recently, Board
appointment has become a highly partisan process. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the
Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1398
(2000) (maintaining that partisan Board appointments have become the norm at the NLRB
over the last thirty years).
14. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 10 (describing how the Board can become
incapacitated if its numbers drop below an acceptable quorum of three members).
15. Chairman Liebman’s third term expired on August 27, 2011 and Member Becker’s
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Nevertheless, assuming for present purposes that the Board decides such a case
with the current Democratic majority, my prediction about the future of board
doctrine in this area may be simultaneously unsurprising and surprising.
Unsurprising, on the one hand, because I do believe the Democratic majority will
seek to limit the number and frequency of captive audience speeches based on the
view that such conduct substantially limits the ability of employees to freely decide
whether they wish to join a union. Surprising, on the other hand, because I believe
the Board will likely not prohibit all captive audience meetings as they could, and
should, under current law. 16 Rather, the Board is likely to engage in a more
restrained approach based on already-existing doctrines and cases, given the
Board’s desire to avoid the misimpression that it is merely engaging in politically
motivated flip-flopping.17
In short, I believe the Board will choose to take one of two paths, depending on
how the captive audience speech issue comes to the Board. First, the case could
come to the Board primarily as an election case, where the Board determines
whether a group of employees wishes to be represented by a union. If there are
objections by the union to the running of the election based on employer captive
audience speeches and their impact on the “laboratory conditions” of the election, 18
the Board could intervene and force a rerun of the election, or even order
bargaining between the parties in an especially egregious case. 19 In fact, under the
recess appointment expires at the end of 2011. Board Members Since 1935, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935; Craig Becker, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/craig-becker. At that point, there is a possibility that
the Board may again fall below the three-person quorum necessary to decide cases. See
NLRB Chair’s Departure Raises Questions About Agency’s Future, HRHERO.COM (Aug. 30,
2011),
http://blogs.hrhero.com/hrnews/2011/08/30/nlrb-chairs-departure-raises-questionsabout-agencys-future/ (“In addition to [Chairman] Liebman’s departure, member Craig
Becker’s term ends December 31. Those developments leave many questioning whether the
NLRB will be left crippled in a political environment not conducive to replenishing the
membership.”).
16. See Secunda, supra note 6, at 409–10 (“Based on employee free choice, the
conduct/speech distinction, and the threadbare nature of NLRB precedent in this area, the
Board should return to its Clark Bros. doctrine and make employer captive audience
meetings a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.”).
17. Adjudicatory agencies like the NLRB need to have credibility with parties on both
sides of the dispute. See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive
Conduct, Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 51, 54 n.11 (2004) (“Board decisions driven by political considerations negate the
Board’s claim of superiority in deciding labor disputes based on industrial experience and
expertise and compromise its stature as a neutral independent agency.”).
18. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“[T]he Board’s function [is] to
provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”).
19. The ability of the Board to order an employer to recognize a union and bargain in
good faith with it on a contract is referred to as a “Gissel Bargaining Order” (GBO). See
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610–16 (1969). As Professor Weiler aptly
observed many years ago, however, GBOs tend to be ineffective. See Paul Weiler, Promises
to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1794–95 (1983). They only give the union the right to bargain, not the right to “direct
the employer to make a reasonable contract offer.” Id.at 1794. In any event, even Democratic
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Peerless Plywood doctrine,20 the Board has already articulated an election rule that
neither the employer nor the union may give a captive audience speech twenty-four
hours before a representation election. So, if the Obama Board wishes to provide
additional protection against employer captive audience speeches, including antiunion speech by supervisors, it could move to extend the period during which
captive audience speeches are prohibited from the current twenty-four-hour rule to
a week or two before the actual holding of the election. 21
In doing so, the Board could choose to focus on an aspect of its historical
treatment of captive audience meetings that has been largely ignored over the last
fifty years. For example, in Economic Machinery Co., the Board held that “the
technique of calling the employees into the [e]mployer’s office individually . . . is,
in itself, conduct calculated to interfere with . . . free choice . . . regardless of the
noncoercive tenor of an employer’s . . . remarks.” 22 In subsequent cases, the Board
expanded this doctrine to find employer conduct objectionable “where it can be
said on reasonable grounds that, because of the small size of the groups
interviewed, the locus of the interview, the position of the interviewer in the
employer’s hierarchy, and the tenor of the speaker’s remarks, [the Board is] not
justified in assuming that the election results represented the employees’ true
wishes.”23 Although the Board in Mead-Atlanta Paper Co. held that large group
meetings did not have the same coercive influence as small group meetings,24 fifty
years of caselaw involving captive audience speeches have provided adequate
empirical data that such an observation may need to be revisited by the Obama
Board.25 Surely, the Board would be free now to rely upon industrial experience in
this area post-Mead-Atlanta to conclude that it was previously wrong in finding
that larger meetings would foster “free and open discussion.” Indeed, it is well
within the discretion of the Board to find “as a matter of industrial experience” 26
that the policies of the Act are not effectuated by allowing unfettered employer

Boards have been reluctant to issue GBOs in recent years. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Yes,
Virginia, There Still Are Gissel Bargaining Orders, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Nov. 21,
2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/11/yes-virginia-th.html.
20. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
21. To the extent that Congress enacts some form of expedited election legislation,
expanding the Peerless Plywood doctrine could be quite effective.
22. 111 N.L.R.B. 947, 949 (1955).
23. E.g., NVF Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 664 (1974).
24. 120 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1958) (“It is the isolation of individuals, or of small groups
of employees, most often just a few, from the bulk of their fellow workmen into the locus of
managerial authority which supports the inference that company expressions of anti-union
sentiment in these circumstances borders too closely upon coercive influence over their
choice later expressed in the election.”).
25. See Secunda, supra note 7, at 391–99 (discussing captive audience meeting cases
post-Taft-Hartley).
26. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958). Twenty years later, an
acquaintance who had been subjected to successive captive audience speeches remarked that
when he attended blue collar captive audience meetings during organizing drives it was the
first time the employer had ever held a massed, all hands on deck meeting of any kind. As a
result, many of his coworkers were simply terrified and it took them the better part of several
days to restore esprit de corps.
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captive audience speeches to large groups of employees in the critical period before
the election.
Second, a case may come to the Board primarily as an unfair labor practice case
challenging the use of captive audience tactics. In that instance, the issue would
instead be whether the nature of speech under section 8(c) of the Act causes it to
fall under one of the exceptions to employer free speech protection. 27 If the speech
in question can be seen as either a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit,”28 existing Supreme Court and Board precedent permit a finding of an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) against the employer. 29 Of course, this
finding would not only cause an election to be rerun, but would also lead to the
granting of other forms of appropriate relief, which might include a more liberal
use of access remedies30 for the union to speak to employees on company
premises.31
This unfair labor practice approach to captive audience speech would be
different from current Board practice in two meaningful ways. First, the Board
would more closely scrutinize challenges to employer speeches made in captive
audience settings to determine the coercive nature of the speech under the specific
circumstances of the case, rather than simply rely on the conclusory statement that
such speeches are permitted under current Board precedent. Second, the Board
could apply a presumption of employer coercion where employees are faced with
losing their jobs if they decide to leave the meeting, or where they are refused the
ability to interact with and question the speakers. 32 This presumption of coercion

27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
28. Id.
29. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(2006); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617–19 (1969) (“[A]n employer is free
only to tell ‘what he reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of
unionization that are outside of his control,’ and not ‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken
solely on his own volition.’” (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir.
1967))); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The danger inherent in
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”).
30. See generally Robert M. Worster, III, If It’s Hardly Worth Doing, It’s Hardly Worth
Doing Right: How the NLRA’s Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies, 38 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 1073, 1076 (2004) (“‘Access remedies’ allow unions to communicate with
employees free from employer reprisals, whereas ‘notice remedies’ inform ‘employees of
their statutory rights and the legal limits on the [e]mployer’s conduct’ while assuring them
that ‘further violations will not occur.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Teamsters Local 115
v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
31. It has been observed in some professional circles that captive audience speech
coupled with the inability of the union to reply to this speech makes the situation
hypercoercive. An access remedy like the one issued in Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB,
227 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2000), may well provide a partial remedy to this hypercoercive
situation.
32. The adoption of an employer coercion presumption in this context would effectively
overturn NLRB v. Prescott Industrial Products Co., 500 F.2d 6, 9–11 (8th Cir. 1974)
(refusing to enforce an NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning
during a captive audience meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); Litton Systems, Inc.,
173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (indicating that “[a]n employee has no statutorily protected
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could be applied based on the recognized power disparities between employers and
employees,33 based on unions’ lack of access to employer property to disseminate
pro-union messages,34 and based on the fact that neither the First Amendment nor
section 8(c) of the Act give employers the right to compel unwilling employees to
listen to non-work-related speeches they do not wish to hear.35 The employer,
however, could overcome this presumption by satisfying a modified form of the
Struksnes polling test36 to assure the noncoercive nature of such captive audience
speeches. Such a showing would ensure that employees were told the purpose of
such meetings, were assured against retaliation for asking questions during these
meetings, and were not otherwise intimidated by their employer’s speech or
conduct.
In all, then, this Article predicts that the Obama Board will seek in some manner
to more closely regulate employer captive audience speeches. Part I provides a
general background on employer captive audience speeches in the labor law
context. Part II considers how the Obama Board might respond to an election case
raising captive audience issues. Part III alternatively explores how the Obama
Board might deal with an unfair labor practice case involving employer captive
audience tactics, and suggests, in the process, the adoption of a presumption of
employer coercion where employer captive audience speeches are utilized. In all, it
is likely that the Obama Board will change the contours of its captive audience
speech doctrine for the first time since Babcock & Wilcox,37 the Board decision that
first established the legality of employer captive audience speeches in 1948.38
right to leave a [mandatory antiunion captive audience] meeting”); and Hicks Ponder Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. 806, 815 (1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union
workers who speak out once captive audience meetings have begun).
33. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“[A]ny balancing of [Section 8(a)(1) and 8(c)] rights
must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and
the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”);
see also NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (“Employees during working hours are the classic captive
audience.”); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (“Few audiences are more captive than
the average worker.”).
34. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that an
employer may prohibit non-employee union solicitation on its property unless the location of
the plant is so remote that the union is unable to communicate with employees through its
own reasonable efforts); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1992)
(holding that the Babcock inaccessibility exception is narrow and generally only applies to
remote locations such as logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels).
35. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a
right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 537–38 (1945) (finding that employers may have the right to persuade their employees,
but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it
that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been passed”).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 140–45 (explaining how Struksnes employee
polling standards could be modified to apply to captive audience meetings in the labor
context).
37. 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
38. For criticisms of the Board’s reasoning in Babcock & Wilcox, see Secunda, supra
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I. EMPLOYER CAPTIVE AUDIENCE SPEECH AND CONCEPTS OF COERCION
A. The History of Board Treatment of Employer Captive Audience Speech
In its initial form as the Wagner Act of 1935,39 the NLRA did not protect
employer speech rights during an organizational campaign. 40 As a result, most
employers initially remained neutral while unions sought to organize their
employees.41 Consequently, when the Board first specifically addressed the legality
of employer captive audience speeches in the 1946 case of Clark Brothers Co.,42 it
was not surprising that the Board adopted a rule that employer captive audience
speeches during work time amounted to a per se violation of employee section 7
rights to organize43:
The Board has long recognized that “the rights guaranteed to
employees by the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice,
and information from others, concerning those rights and their
enjoyment.” Such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the
employees are also free to determine whether or not to receive such aid,
advice, and information. To force employees to receive such aid,
advice, and information impairs that freedom; it is calculated to, and
does, interfere with the selection of a representative of the employees’
choice.44
Because the mandatory attendance policy was not concerned with the company’s
speech on unionization, the Board regulated the employer’s captive audience
speech as inherently coercive.45
This state of affairs quickly changed as a result of the passage of the TaftHartley Act of 1947.46 The Taft-Hartley Act recognized that employers expressly
enjoy free speech protection for their noncoercive speech. Section 8(c) now
provides:

note 6, at 409 (maintaining that “Babcock & Wilcox is simply irreconcilable with the Act’s
policy of employee free choice”).
39. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006)).
40. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 356, 367 (1995) (“[D]uring the 1935 House
debates on the Wagner Act, an amendment which would have guaranteed an employer’s
right to free speech was rejected ‘as having no place in this bill.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935))).
41. See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 94 (5th ed. 2006)
(explaining that the Board under the Wagner Act took the position that any partisan
employer involvement would inevitably interfere with the section 7 rights of employees).
42. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
43. See id. at 804–05.
44. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Harlan Fuel Company,
8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938)).
45. Id.
46. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–144, 167, 172–
187 (2006).
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The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.47
As a result of this language, and somewhat controversially, the Board reversed
its Clark Brothers approach to captive audience speech and specifically found that
the holding of such meetings did not violate section 8(a)(1).48 In coming to this
holding, the Board merely stated that, “the language of section 8(c) of the amended
Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros.
case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices [based on captive
audience speeches].”49 Former NLRB Chairman William Gould has remarked that
the shift in doctrine was done “reluctant[ly].” 50 Yet, the Board has consistently, and
as recently as 1998, refused to revisit its captive audience speech doctrine. 51

47. Id. at § 158(c) (emphasis added).
48. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
49. Id. For a while after Babcock & Wilcox, unions were able to make similar speeches
in reply. See Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 611 (1951). However, even this equal
access rule was short-lived, and the Board reversed its course in Livingston Shirt Corp., 107
N.L.R.B. 400, 406–09 (1953).
50. See Gould, supra note 5, at 484 n.111.
51. See id. (citing Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998)
(Gould, Chairman, dissenting); see also Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, 326 N.L.R.B. at 352
(Brame, Member, concurring) (“[T]he legislative history is explicit that, with the insertion of
Section 8(c) in the law, Congress overruled the Board’s Clark Bros. Co. decision, in which
the Board had banned employers from making noncoercive captive audience speeches.”).
Member Brame, concurring in Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, stated the applicable precedent
concerning employer speech and section 8(c) this way:
1. An employer has the right to express its views about labor issues and
unionization in noncoercive terms; put another way, Congress may not restrict
an employer’s noncoercive speech. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969); Section 8(c) of the Act; First Amendment, U.S. Constitution.
2. [The employer’s] free speech right embraces the right to address employees
in mandatory meetings held on company time without affording equal time to
the union or to prounion employees. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400
(1953); NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954); May Co. v.
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512
(5th Cir. 1968); Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 319 (7th Cir.
1995); see also Section 8(c) of the Act and its legislative history, S.Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 23–24 (1947); 13 NLRB Ann. Rep. 49 (1948).
Id. at 350 (formatting in original). I believe that pro-employer Board members and
practitioners continue to see the applicable precedent and law in this matter. It is the
second point that, for the reasons discussed below, I believe the Obama Board is ready
to revisit.
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B. The Threat and Benefit Clause Under Section 8(c)
It would be another fifteen years after Taft-Hartley and the promulgation of
section 8(c) before the U.S. Supreme Court gave its views about the meaning of the
threat and benefit language and recognized employees’ heightened vulnerability to
coercion in the context of employer promises during organizing campaigns. In the
1964 case of NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the Boilermakers union told the
company that it had majority support from the proposed bargaining unit, but the
union ended up filing a petition for an election and an election was held. 52
Two weeks before the election, the company sent a letter in an envelope
detailing all the benefits it had granted to employees since 1949, and further stated
that “[t]he Union can’t put any of those things in your envelope–only the Company
can do that.”53 The company also created “a new system for computing overtime
during holiday weeks which had the effect of increasing wages for those weeks,
and a new vacation schedule which enabled employees to extend their vacations.”54
This short time before the election was the first time that the employer announced
these changes in policies to benefit employees. 55 Subsequently, the union ended up
losing the election and filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charges. 56 The question
presented to the U.S. Supreme Court concerned the scope of the Act’s limits on an
employer’s ability to confer economic benefits on its employees shortly before a
representation election.57
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit. 58 It reinstated the Board’s order that the
employer’s conduct had coercively interfered with the employees’ organizational
rights under section 7 of the Act, even though the increased wages and vacation
benefits were granted unconditionally and on a permanent basis. 59 Instead, it agreed
with the Board that the employer conferred these new benefits to induce employees
to vote against the union.60 The Court observed that section 8(a)(1) prohibits
“conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express
purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and
is reasonably calculated to have that effect.” 61 The famous and vivid phrase from
the case further explained that “[t]he danger inherent in well-timed increases in
benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”62
Five years later, in the 1969 decision of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Court
considered the contours of a nonprotected employer speech under the “threats”

52. 375 U.S. 405, 406 (1964).
53. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. (“Although Exchange Parts asserts that the policy behind the latter two benefits
was established earlier, it is clear that the letter of March 4 was the first general
announcement of the changes to the employees.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 405–06.
58. Id. at 405.
59. Id. at 409–10.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 409.
62. Id.
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clause in section 8(c).63 Gissel involved four consolidated cases raising common
issues of alleged employer coercion during organizing campaigns. 64 In one case,
the Teamsters began to organize at two Sinclair-owned companies by obtaining
authorization cards from eleven of the fourteen employees they sought to
represent.65 The Teamsters demanded recognition based on having received
authorization cards from the majority of bargaining unit members, but Sinclair
refused to grant recognition. 66 The Teamsters then petitioned for an election.67
During the ensuing election campaign, Sinclair made references to a previous
strike that resulted in the employees throwing out the union. 68 The president of
Sinclair also emphasized that election of the union could put Sinclair out of
business, that the company was “on ‘thin ice’ financially,” and that reemployment
would be difficult because of the employees’ ages and skills. 69 Lastly, the president
of Sinclair sent out threatening letters, which spoke ill of the Teamsters. 70 After the
union ended up losing the election by a vote of seven to six, it filed ULP charges
and objections to set aside the election. 71
The Board held that Sinclair’s communications were reasonably understood to
threaten loss of jobs if the union was elected, and therefore found a violation of
section 8(a)(1).72 The Board also ordered the election to be set aside.73 The U.S.
Supreme Court enforced the Board’s findings in Gissel and held that “an employer
is free to communicate to [its] employees any of [its] general views about . . . a
particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.’” 74 Specifically, the Court observed that “an
employer is free only to tell ‘what [it] reasonably believes will be the likely
economic consequences of unionization that are outside [its] control,’ and not
‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on [its] own volition.’” 75
In short, the Court made a distinction between an employer “prediction” and an
employer “threat.” An employer may predict the likely effects it expects
unionization to have on the company. The prediction, however, “must be carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to
demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a
management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of
unionization.”76

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Id.
Id. at 587.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 587–88.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
See id. at 589, 619–20.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619 (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967)).
Id. at 618.
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If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action
solely on [its] own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to [the employer], the statement is no
longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of
retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such
without the protection of the First Amendment. 77
Thus, an employer must avoid conscious overstatements that will likely mislead its
employees.78
So at least since 1969, the Supreme Court has recognized that both threats of
reprisal and promises of benefit by the employer during a representation election
campaign coercively interfere with employees’ freedom to choose if they wish to
unionize. Yet, the Board has chosen not to revisit its Babcock & Wilcox decision
finding that employer captive audience speeches do not constitute coercive
speech.79 This Article takes the view that, given the current membership of the
Obama Board, a good chance exists that the Obama Board will re-examine how
Exchange Parts and Gissel impact the future treatment by the Board of employer
captive audience speech during union organizational campaigns. 80
So, why has the Board concluded that captive audience speeches are not
inherently coercive, and thus subject to the threat and benefit language in the last
clause of section 8(c)? Do that section and Supreme Court precedent not clearly
state that employer free speech rights in the labor context are not absolute?81
Section 8(c) expressly permits employers to state their opinions on unionization in
a noncoercive fashion. The NLRA, however, does not permit employers to
coercively force employees to attend non-work related meetings, and the statute
does not grant employers the right to coercively force employees to attend meetings
and listen to those views as unwilling participants. 82 Clearly, one could argue, and

77. Id.
78. Id. at 620.
79. See notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
80. The Board has only revisited the legality of employer captive audience meetings on
a few occasions. For instance, in Litton Systems, Inc., the Board merely reiterated the same
conclusory language found in Babcock & Wilcox: “[T]he Board has held as long ago as
1948, that such a finding [of a ULP in a captive audience context] is barred by ‘the language
of Section 8(c) of the amended Act and its legislative history.’” 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1031
(1968) (quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948)); see also F.W.
Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (permitting an employer to exclude prounion employee’s from asking questions during captive audience meetings). It is interesting
to note that although Exchange Parts had been decided when the Board decided Litton
Systems, the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on the meaning of coercive threats
by employers as it later would in the 1969 Gissel Packing case.
81. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“Any assessment of the precise scope of employer
expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an
employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as
those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c).”).
82. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 405 (1995) (“[T]he NLRB and the courts
overlook and/or permit many election statements and interventions by employers which are,
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other commentators already have,83 that the exceptions to section 8(c) for “threats
of reprisal or force and promise of benefit” come into play and serve as another
basis for limiting section 8(c) protections for employers who engage in captive
audience speech.84
There may not be a good explanation as to why Gissel has not yet been
specifically applied to the captive audience setting and why the Board continues to
adhere to the idea that Taft-Hartley unequivocally overturned the Clark Bros.
doctrine.85 As I have analyzed in some detail in an earlier article, the legislative
history of Taft-Hartley and the language of section 8(c) simply do not support such
an unequivocal conclusion.86 In that previous article, I wrote:
As far as the phantom “legislative history” to which Babcock &
Wilcox refers in deciding that Taft-Hartley permits captive audience
meetings, one can make the educated guess that the Board was
obliquely referring to statements made in the Senate Report during the
Congressional debates over Taft-Hartley. Apparently, some legislators
believed that Clark Bros. inappropriately “restricted” or “limited” the
Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Collins, which held, among
other things, that employers had the same speech rights as unions to
talk about labor issues. Additionally, although the Senate Report on the
Taft-Hartley Act specifically disapproved of Clark Bros., it only stated
that the case stood for the proposition that employer speech was
unlawful merely because it took place “in the plant on working time.” It
appears though that the majority in Clark Bros. answered those same
concerns when it responded to an argument by the dissenting Board
member in Babcock & Wilcox: “We simply do not share his view that
there is anything in the reasoning or language of the recent Supreme
Court and Circuit Court decisions he cites [including Thomas v.
Collins] which requires the Board to treat this particular respondent as
though it had done no more than make an appeal to the reasoning
faculties of its employees.” In other words, the Clark Bros. majority

in fact, coercive and which have a tendency, as a result, to chill the exercise of employee
rights of self-organization.”).
83. Story believes that captive audience speech is a paradigmatic example of such
unrecognized coercive interventions. See id. at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s
legally-sanctioned right to hold such captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from
holding them, to forbid the asking of questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees
who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a manifestation of coercive power and domination.” (footnote
omitted)).
84. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections
and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 559 (1993) (“Although the Board ratified
captive audience speeches on account of the free speech proviso, such conduct involves an
element of coercion easily distinguishable from expression. The captive audience speech is
diametrically opposed to the ‘free and open discussion’ the Board professes to promote.”).
Of course, Member Becker is now a member of the Obama Board.
85. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (setting forth the common management
reasoning underlying its unwillingness to regulate employer captive audience speeches in the
labor context).
86. See Secunda, supra note 7, at 398–99 (describing in detail the threadbare nature of
NLRB precedent in the captive audience speech area).
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was responding to the coercive aspects of the captive audience
meetings, not its speech elements.
....
Of course, it goes without saying that there is a complete absence in
the text of Section 8(c) itself of any language that could be read to
mandate that the Board post-Taft Hartley overturn Clark Bros. Indeed,
to the extent that the language of Section 8(c) is unambiguous in
protecting employer speech in the labor context, canons of construction
would suggest that it is inappropriate to look for further meaning from
the statute in legislative pronouncements. In this regard, Justice Scalia
has maintained: “We have repeatedly held that such reliance on
[legislative history] is impermissible where, as here, the statutory
language is unambiguous.” On the other hand, to the extent that the
language of Section 8(c) could be deemed ambiguous, other
contemporaneous legislative debates cast significant doubt on whether
Section 8(c) was ever supposed to address the permissibility of captive
audience meetings. In short, conclusory assertions aside concerning
inapplicable provisions and mysterious legislative history, the Board
appears to have remained free to uphold Clark Bros. even after the
enactment of Section 8(c).87
In the absence of more precise legislative history that Congress meant to leave
employer captive audience speeches regulated, overturning Babcock & Wilcox
would have the salubrious effect of “provid[ing] greater protection for employee
free choice.”88
The next two Parts consider how the Board might modify its captive audience
doctrine if such a case comes to be decided. Part II considers a “laboratory
conditions” election case, while Part III explores a potential unfair labor practice
case under section 8(a)(1).
II. THE LABORATORY CONDITIONS APPROACH: EXTENDING PEERLESS PLYWOOD
In the 1948 case of General Shoe Corp., shortly after the enactment of TaftHartley, the Board held that section 8(c) only applies in ULP cases, not election
cases.89 As a result, the Board can set aside and order new elections for
communication or conduct that does not constitute a ULP (like coercive speech),
but still makes an election unfair because the conduct interferes with an employee’s
ability to decide freely if he or she desires union representation.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court and Board have repeatedly observed the
centrality of employee free choice under the NLRA. As recently, as Chamber of
Commerce v. Brown, both the U.S. Supreme Court90 and the Board91 have

87. Id. at 395–97 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
88. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 438 (2007) (using the same reasoning to
overturn the forty-year-old voluntary recognition bar doctrine).
89. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 n.10 (1948).
90. See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996) (discussing the
NLRA’s “command to respect ‘the free choice of employees’” to select bargaining
representatives (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,
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repeatedly emphasized the NLRA’s policy in favor of employee free choice. In
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,92 the Court addressed whether a California
statute was preempted by the NLRA where the statute prohibited employers who
receive state funds from using those funds to promote or deter organization. 93 In the
process of holding that the statute was preempted by the NLRA,94 Justice Stevens
reaffirmed that the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrated Congressional intent to favor
representation elections because employee free choice can be thereby assured. 95
To determine if employees are being permitted to exercise free choice when
voting in favor of or against union representation, the Board created in General
Shoe Corp. the “laboratory conditions” test:
In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions
as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our
duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare
extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of
others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the
experiment must be conducted over again. 96
In short, General Shoe held that communications during union campaigns do not
constitute an unfair labor practice. Rather, because the employer had interfered
with employee free choice, the Board ordered that the election be rerun.
Shortly thereafter, the Board applied the General Shoe doctrine to captive
audience speeches. Under Peerless Plywood, neither employers nor unions may
make captive meeting speeches to massed groups of employees within twenty-four
hours of an election.97 In that case, the Board stated that it was “institut[ing] [the
38 (1987))); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 607–08 (1969) (discussing the
Board’s obligation to ensure employee free choice in the use of authorization cards); NLRB
v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (holding that section 8(a)(1) prohibits
employer conduct that inhibits employees freedom of choice); Garment Workers’ Union v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (“[T]he Wagner Act guarantees employees’ freedom of
choice and majority rule.”); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99–100 (1954) (observing that
secret ballot union representation elections safeguard employee free choice).
91. See, e.g., Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 441 (2007) (“[Employee] free choice is,
after all, the fundamental value protected by the Act.”); Madison Square Garden Ct., LLC,
350 N.L.R.B. 117 117, 119 (2007) (setting aside the representation election because a
supervisor’s conduct coerced and interfered with employee free choice); Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 993 (1992) (discussing the Wagner Act’s ban on employer dominated
labor organizations as furthering Congress’ goal of promoting employee free choice when
selecting a labor organization); Midland Nat’l Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982)
(recognizing that deceptive practices that interfere with employee free choice are grounds to
set an election aside).
92. 554 U.S. 60 (2008).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 66.
95. See id. at 74 (“The NLRB has policed a narrow zone of speech to ensure free and
fair elections under the aegis of § 9 of the NLRA . . . .”).
96. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127 (footnote omitted).
97. 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953). See also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400,
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twenty-four-hour] rule pursuant to [its] statutory authority and obligation to
conduct elections in circumstances and under conditions which will insure
employees a free and untrammeled choice.” 98
After Peerless Plywood, objectionable employer conduct was extended to apply
to additional captive speech situations. For example, two years after Peerless
Plywood, in Economic Machinery Co.,99 the Board held that “the technique of
calling the employees into the Employer’s office individually” is itself “conduct
calculated to interfere with . . . free choice . . . regardless of the noncoercive tenor
of an employer’s actual remarks.” 100 So, to the extent that the captive audience
speech involves a one-on-one conversation between a supervisor and an employee
concerning the union, Board law appears to favor finding a violation of the
election’s laboratory conditions.
But going even further than that, the Board expanded its doctrine on captive
audience speeches in the laboratory conditions context where the employer sought
to meet with small groups of employees on its terms and in its territory. For
instance, in NVF Co., the Board found employer conduct objectionable “where it
can be said on reasonable grounds that, because of the small size of the groups
interviewed, the locus of the interview, the position of the interviewer in the
employer’s hierarchy, and the tenor of the speaker’s remarks” the employee is no
longer able to freely express his or her wishes concerning union representation. 101
Now, it is true that in the 1958 case of Mead-Atlanta Paper Co.,102 the Board
held that large group meetings, like the modern captive audience meetings of today,
do not have the same coercive influence as one-on-one meetings or the smaller
meetings described in NVF. According to the Board in Mead-Atlanta, this is
because “[w]hen employees are gathered . . . in open areas of the plant . . . there
results free and open discussion with both management and employees enjoying the
confidences and assurances which are normal aspects of collective and group
activities.”103 Of course, the last fifty years of experience have been filled with
cases in which employees are not permitted to engage in a “free and open
discussion” with their employer about unionization and, in fact, may be terminated
from employment if they seek to speak or wish to leave the meeting. 104 Surely, the
408 (1953) (“The rule laid down in Peerless Plywood is a rule of conduct governing Board
elections and, in our opinion, constitutes a narrow and reasonable limitation designed to
facilitate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of relative tranquility conducive to a
sober choice of representative.”).
98. Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. at 429.
99. 111 N.L.R.B. 947 (1955).
100. Id. at 948.
101. 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 664 (1974); see also Flex Products, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1117,
1118 (1986).
102. 120 N.L.R.B. 832 (1958).
103. Id. at 833.
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 8, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974)
(refusing to enforce an NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning
during a captive audience meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); Litton Sys., Inc., 173
N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (stating that an employee has no statutorily protected right to
leave a mandatory anti-union captive audience meeting); Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B.
806, 811–12, 815 (1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union workers
who speak out once captive audience meetings have begun).
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Board should be free now to rely upon fifty years of industrial experience postMead-Atlanta to conclude that the Board was previously wrong in finding that
larger meetings would foster free and open discussion. Indeed, it is well within the
discretion of the Board to find “as a matter of industrial experience” that the
policies of the Act are not effectuated by allowing unfettered employer captive
audience speeches to large groups of employees in the critical period before the
election.105
More recently, current Board doctrine treats communications by pro-union
supervisors as similarly coercive as that speech made by anti-union supervisors.
The Board found in Harborside Health Care, Inc. that such speech is capable of
leading to a General Shoe laboratory conditions test violation. 106 Although the
Board made clear that supervisor pro-union speech is not objectionable in and of
itself,107 the 3-2 Republican majority reaffirmed long-held Board precedent that
pro-union supervisory conduct may be grounds for setting aside an election without
there being an explicit threat of reprisal or promise of benefit. 108 More specifically,
the Board adopted a rule that supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards
is inherently coercive absent mitigating circumstances.109 More recent holdings
suggesting that management agents have more rights to coerce employees in this
regard are simply wrong. 110
As far as what the Obama Board might do if an election case with employer
captive audience speeches arises, the Board may move to set aside such an election
if the captive audience meeting occurs close in time to the actual election. The
proximity of the employer speech to the election is an important consideration,
since if the union has an effective chance to respond to the employer’s views on
unionization, the coercive nature of the employer speech may be minimized. Thus,
it is possible that the Board will seek not to completely ban such captive audience
speeches as inherently coercive. Rather, the Board may expand the Peerless
Plywood period to reflect modern-day realities as far as how likely it will be that
the union can effectively respond, outside of the workplace, to the employer’s
captive audience speech.
One possibility as far as extending the no-captive-speech time period would be
an approach based on the realities of the fast-paced, technologically driven
workplaces of the twenty-first century, in which employees are inundated with vast
amounts of workplace information. In such modern-day workplaces, a different
standard may be necessary to assure that the union can respond to the employer’s

105. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958).
106. See Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 916 (2004) (reversing precedent
and liberalizing standard for finding pro-union supervisory conduct objectionable in context
of representation elections).
107. Id. at 911.
108. Id. at 909.
109. Id. at 911.
110. See, e.g., Aladdin Gaming, L.L.C., 345 N.L.R.B. 585 (2005) (finding lawful a
management official’s interruption of off-duty employees’ conversation about signing union
authorization cards); Werthan Packaging, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 343 (2005) (finding no
objectionable election conduct where manager interrogated employee and stated that voting
for union was not in best interests of employee and her family).
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speech to the employee in a meaningful way. A larger buffer zone between captive
audience speeches and the holding of an election would also give employees the
necessary time to digest the information provided by both the employer and
employee. A shorter buffer zone between captive audience meetings and the
election would tip the scales unfairly in the employer’s favor.
The need for a longer time without captive audience speeches before election is
also supported by the observation that many employees live far away from work.
Board law is clear that unions, unlike employers, are generally not permitted to
give speeches to employees at the workplace. 111 Even if the union does possess a
hall or meeting space, an employer’s right to give speeches at the workplace is a
tremendous advantage in the modern-day workplace, where it is difficult for unions
to gather far-flung employees after work. 112 One way to provide the union a
meaningful time to reply to employer captive audience speech is to not permit any
captive audience speeches a week or two before the election. To paraphrase
Livingston Shirt Corp., a Board case decided the same year as Peerless Plywood,
such an extension would still “constitute[] a narrow and reasonable limitation
designed to facilitate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of relative
tranquility conducive to a sober choice of representative.” 113
Moreover, for the reasons discussed in Members Liebman and Walsh’s dissent
in Guard Publishing Co.,114 I think the Board is likely to view new workplace
realities as requiring additional protections to allow employees to exercise free
choice. In Guard Publishing Co., the Board considered whether the employer
violated section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a policy prohibiting the use of e-mail for all
“non-job-related solicitations.”115 The Board held, in a 3-2 decision, that “the . . .
employees have no statutory right to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section
7 purposes,” and, therefore, the policy did not violate section 8(a)(1).116 The case
came down to the Board majority’s conclusion that “where the Board has addressed
whether employees have the right to use other types of employer-owned property—
such as bulletin boards, telephones, and televisions—for Section 7
communications, the Board has consistently held that there is ‘no statutory
right . . . to use an employer’s equipment or media,’ as long as the restrictions are
nondiscriminatory.”117

111. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
112. See Story, supra note 82, at 380 (“To equate heavy-handed union tactics of
pressuring an employee to sign a union card with the range of tactics available to employers
(e.g., firing, suspension, failure to promote, favoritism in work assignments, and so on) or to
equate the ‘rough and tumble’ of some union halls and a union shop contract with
hierarchical workplace relationships is to operate from a truly impoverished understanding
of employer coercion and from a false assumption that unions and employer are
equivalent . . . .”).
113. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 408 (1953).
114. 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121–32 (2007).
115. Id. at 1111.
116. Id. at 1110.
117. Id. at 1114 (quoting Mid-Mountain Foods 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000)).
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Members Liebman and Walsh observed in the Guard Publishing dissent that
e-mail has revolutionized communication within the workplace.118 In a theme that
Chairman Liebman later discussed in more detail in an academic article she
penned, she and Member Walsh observed in the dissent to Guard Publishing Co.
that e-mail has revolutionized business and personal communications. Liebman and
Walsh argued that, by failing to carve out an exception for e-mail to settled
principles regarding use of employer property, the Board was failing to adapt the
Act to the changing patterns of industrial life and had thus become the “Rip Van
Winkle of administrative agencies.” 119 Although captive audience speeches do not
generally involve the use of e-mail as in Guard Publishing Co., Democratic
members of the Board have shown a willingness to change existing rules to reflect
the changing realities of the new workplace. They assert that “[n]ational labor
policy must be responsive to the enormous technological changes that are taking
place in our society,”120 and that there exists a “responsibility to adapt the Act to
changing patterns of industrial life.”121 Other changing patterns of industrial life
include the increasing mobility of the workforce and the fact that employees tend
not to remain for long periods of times in the same facility or with the same
employer, traveling to many different locations in short periods of time. 122
All of this suggests that a Democratic Board majority may decide to extend the
Peerless Plywood period to make it less likely that employer captive audience
speeches close to the election would undermine the laboratory conditions of the
election. The longer the Peerless Plywood period, the better the chance that the
union will have adequate time to craft a meaningful reply to the employer that most
of the employees will be likely to hear. 123 The Board should be able to make this

118. Id. at 1121. Chairman Liebman later wrote about this theme in more detail:
In this historical context, American labor law, enacted when the prototypical
workplace was the factory, and the rotary telephone was “the last word in
desktop technology,” increasingly appears out of sync with changing workplace
realities. Yet the Board itself has made little sustained effort to adjust its legal
doctrines to preserve worker protections in a ruthlessly competitive economy.
In short, labor law policymakers and enforcers have done too little, too late.
Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 576 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
119. Guard Publishing Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman and Walsh, Members,
dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1125 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)).
122. See Liebman, supra note 118, at 573–74.
123. Alternatively, the Board could reduce the incidence of captive audience speeches by
reducing the time period between the filing of the election petition and the holding of the
election. As of the writing of this Article, the Board has just introduced proposed rules that
would shorten the campaign period. See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would
Streamline Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/22labor.html (“In a move that pleased labor
unions, the National Labor Relations Board proposed new rules on Tuesday to speed up
unionization elections.”).
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change consistent with its role of modifying Board doctrine to address the
complexities surrounding modern industrial relations.124
III. THE ULP APPROACH: REVITALIZING THE THREATS AND BENEFITS CLAUSE OF
SECTION 8(C)
Of course, a case may not come to the Board as an election objection based on
the laboratory conditions approach, but it may come as a more traditional ULP
based on coercive employer communications.125 In this circumstance, the Board
would need to reexamine126 its sixty-year-old Babcock & Wilcox Co. decision,
which held captive-audience speeches to be permissible,127 in light of the more
recent Supreme Court decisions in Exchange Parts and Gissel.128
Actually, even before Exchange Parts and Gissel, evidence was available in
1948, when the Board issued Babcock & Wilcox, that a more searching inquiry
beyond Taft-Hartley should have been completed, including whether the speech
during a captive audience meeting was coercive (as far as containing an explicit
threat or promise) and, therefore, not protected under section 8(c).
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1945 case of Thomas v. Collins,129
could not have been clearer about the limits of employer free speech. Justice
Rutledge, writing for the majority in Thomas, stated with regard to the right to
persuade by speech: “When to this persuasion other things are added which bring
about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the [employer’s First
Amendment] right has been passed.”130 Justice Douglas concurred, stating: “[O]nce
[a person] uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to
influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he is an employer or an
employee.”131

124. See Secunda, supra note 17, at 56 (“By placing the enforcement mechanism of the
Act within the NLRB, Congress expected that experienced officials with an adequate
appreciation of the complexities surrounding industrial relations would make the decisions
that would shape national labor policy.” (footnote omitted)).
125. I leave to my previous articles the observation that speech alone is not what is solely
objectionable here, but the conduct of forcing employees to listen at pain of being fired for
not attending the meeting or not complying with the meeting’s ground rules. See generally
Secunda, supra note 6; Secunda, supra note 7.
126. See supra note 7, at 406 (“Board precedent is not sacrosanct, especially where the
initial Board decision is not supported by a modicum of reasoned elaboration.”).
127. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
128. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The danger inherent in
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”); NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969) (“[A]n employer is free only to tell ‘what he
reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are
outside his control’ and not ‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own
volition.’” (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967)).
129. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
130. Id. at 537–38 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 543–44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Additionally, the Trial Examiner in the Babcock & Wilcox case discussed the
coercive nature of such captive audience speeches. Specifically, in finding a section
8(a)(1) violation, he observed:
Standing individually, [the employer’s] statements in his speeches to
the employees . . . though openly anti-Union, contain no language that
on the surface exceeds the bounds of free speech. If they constitute a
violation of the Act, it is because coercion is to be imputed to them
from the circumstances under which they were uttered and which affect
their meaning.132
This insight is strikingly similar to the one made in Gissel some twenty years later
when the Court wrote with regard to threatening, coercive speech: “[A]ny
balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because
of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.” 133
Thus, the Trial Examiner based his decision of illegality on the contextual and
coercive nature of the captive audience speech. The Trial Examiner found that the
employer exploited its ability to control employees during working hours by
stressing its superior economic position.134
Under an approach more consistent with Gissel and Exchange Parts, the Board
would more closely scrutinize challenges to employer speeches made in a captive
audience setting to determine the coercive nature of the speech under the specific
circumstances of the case. Additionally, it appears that this Board may be more
willing than past Boards to pay closer attention to the realities on the ground as
opposed to more formal concepts of free choice. 135 Such an approach would
recognize how the power disparities between the parties 136 and the lack of equal

132. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. at 595.
133. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617.
134. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. at 578 (“With respect to the ‘compulsory audience’
aspect of the speeches, the Trial Examiner concluded from all the evidence that the notices
of the meetings as well as the oral instructions given to the employees concerning these
meetings removed the element of choice from the employees and, in effect, compelled them
to attend in violation of the Act.”).
135. See Liebman, supra note 118, at 580 (“Increasingly, the Board has adopted a
formalistic approach to interpreting the law, turning away from the real world and the
challenges it poses for labor policy. This approach threatens to result in a loss of confidence
in the Board’s decisionmaking, not simply in terms of the results reached, but also in the way
those results are reached.” (footnote omitted)).
136. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“[A]ny balancing of [section 8(a)(1) and 8(c)] rights
must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and
the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”);
see also NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Employees during working hours are the classic
captive audience.”); Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (“Few audiences are
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union access to the workplace make these employer speeches hypercoercive. 137 As
such, the Board might be willing to apply a presumption of coercion if employees
are subject to coercive ground rules during such meetings, like the inability to
decide to leave the meeting if it becomes coercive or the inability to interact and
question the employer’s speakers.138 Such a presumption would also be based on
the proposition that such conditions on employer speech do not interfere with the
right to engage in noncoercive speech under section 8(c). After all, rights to free
speech do not carry with them the right to compel unwilling employees to listen. 139
As an evidentiary presumption, the employer would still be given a chance to
rebut that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
captive audience tactic did not interfere with the section 7 organizational rights of
employees. Here, I suggest that the Board could borrow from existing Board law in
the area of employee polling to show that their captive audience speech did not
devolve into an intimidating or coercive environment in violation of the Act.
In NLRB v. Lorben Corp., a company’s plant superintendent polled employees
to see if they wished to be represented by a union. 140 Although the Second Circuit
majority found that the employer speech was not intimidating or coercive on its
face,141 Judge Friendly wrote a persuasive opinion in dissent. There, he wrote that,
when an employer sets into motion a formal tabulation, it is not much to ask that he
provide some explanation and assure his employees of no reprisals for their truthful
answers.142
A couple years later, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted Judge Friendly’s
approach to pre-election employee polling. In Struksnes Construction Co.,143 the
owner of a construction company personally solicited signatures of employees as to
more captive than the average worker.”).
137. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (employer may
prohibit non-employee union solicitation on its property unless the location of the plant is so
remote that the union is unable to communicate with employees through its own reasonable
efforts); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1992) (holding that the
Babcock inaccessibility exception is narrow and generally only applies to remote locations
such as logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels).
138. The adoption of the employer coercion presumption would effectively overturn
Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (indicating that employee has no
statutorily protected right to leave a mandatory anti-union captive audience meeting); NLRB
v. Prescott Indus. Products Co., 500 F.2d 6, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974) (refusing to enforce an
NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning during a captive audience
meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); and Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 815
(1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union workers who speak out once
captive audience meetings have begun).
139. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a
right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 537–38 (1945) (finding that employers may have a right to persuade their employees,
but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it
that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been passed.”
(footnote omitted)).
140. 345 F.2d 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1965).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 349 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
143. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
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whether they wished to be represented by the union. 144 The employer did not
explain his purposes or promise no reprisal against employees voting for the union.
Reversing the Board, the court believed that coercion was inherent in such polling
and therefore directed the NLRB to develop appropriate policy considerations and
to outline minimal standards to govern polling on union preferences.
On remand, the Board adopted the following five prong standard:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an
employer will be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the
following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to
determine the truth of a union’s claim of majority, (2) this purpose is
communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are
given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the
employer has not engaged in [ULPs] or otherwise created a coercive
atmosphere.145
The Struksnes standards for polling could readily be modified to ensure that
captive audience speeches do not become coercive. First, the purpose of the captive
audience speech would have to be to noncoercively inform employees of their
employers’ view on unionism in accordance with section 8(c). Second, that purpose
must be communicated to employees during the captive audience speech. Third, the
employer must assure employees that by asking questions or otherwise indicating
pro-union views during such meetings, that no reprisal will be taken against them.
The fourth prong of the Struksnes test would not apply in the captive audience
context as it specifically involves the nature of polling activity. Finally, under the
fifth prong of the current Struksnes test (and what would be the fourth factor under
the modified test), the employer would have to show that the captive audience
speech did not creative a coercive environment. This could be readily done by
permitting employees to speak during the meeting and by allowing employees to
leave during the meeting without reprisal if they believe the meeting has become
coercive or threatening.
In all, given the potentially coercive nature of captive audience meetings, the
employer should have to meet a fairly high standard to convince a factfinder that
such a meeting is consistent with employees being able to freely choose to join a
union. One approach the Obama Board may adopt is the modified Struksnes
standard to ensure that employee section 7 rights in this context are preserved.
CONCLUSION
This Article maintains that the Obama Board is likely to revisit the captive
audience speech doctrine for the first time in decades. Because of modern
workplace realities, the use of captive audience speeches by employers has become
highly effective in interfering with the free choice rights of employees to decide
whether to be represented by a union. Employees now deserve an extra layer of
protection from this coercive employer tactic. To be clear, these are not normal

144. Id. at 1062.
145. Id. at 1063.
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staff meetings—the kind where everyone in the office gets together once a week
and discusses something like organizational philosophy. These are out-of-theordinary, all-hands-on-deck meetings that simply terrify many employees, who are
not able to leave or speak and who face termination if they break the employer’s
draconian ground rules.
The response of the Obama Board will likely depend on whether the future case
presents itself as primarily an election case or one that also involves an allegation
of an unfair labor practice. If an election case, the Board is more likely to expand
the Peerless Plywood doctrine to provide additional insulation for employee free
choice in light of modern workplace realities involving fast-paced and technologydriven workplaces and more widely dispersed labor forces.
If a union raises the captive audience speech issue in a case alleging a section
8(a)(1) ULP, the Board might reexamine its precedent and consider when exactly
employer captive audience speech tactics become coercive under Exchange Parts
and Gissel. This approach would require a more searching inquiry into the content
of the speech. It might also lead the Board to adopt a presumption of employer
coercion where employees are unable to leave such a meeting or ask questions of
the employer’s representative. An employer would be able to rebut such a
presumption under a modified form of the Struksnes polling standards that would
make clear the purpose of such meetings and assure employees against retaliation
for not adhering to the employer’s anti-union message.

